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In a photograph from Yale University’s Beinecke Rare Book and Manu-
script Library, a light-skinned woman stands behind a larger-than-life-
size  caricature  of  an  African  American 
eating a slice of watermelon (fig. 1).1 The 
young man, shoeless and dressed in rags, 
perches  on  a  fence.  The  woman  poses 
behind the cutout; her hand gently over-
laps with the caricature’s. She bares her 
teeth, miming her own bite from the fruit. 
A typed caption on the back of the image 
indicates that the photograph was taken at 
the Hotel Exposition, a gathering of pro-
fessionals from the hotel industry, in New 
York City’s Grand Central Palace. At some 
point, a curator at the Beinecke penciled 
“c. 1930.”
How might one read this ugly, enig-
matic  image,  this  chip  of  racial  history 
archived at Yale? Taking a cue from Robyn 
Wiegman,  who  has  influentially  called 
for a transition from questions of “why” 
to “how” with regard to race, one might 
bracket questions about the woman and 
her interiority: Who was she? Why did she 
pose as she did? What did her actions mean 
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Figure 1. A woman poses with caricature at the Hotel 
Exposition in New York’s Grand Central Palace, circa 
1930. Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library,  
Yale University68  Bernstein ∙ Material Culture and the Performance of Race
to her? These questions are unanswerable not only because the woman 
never archived a written explanation of her intentions but also, and more 
significantly, because the “whys” of race are often unstable and inconsis-
tent, unspoken or unspeakable. Given the “difficulties of handling why,” 
Wiegman suggests, scholars might “take refuge” in the “how,” trusting 
the “how” ultimately to register the “why.”2 In the “watermelon” photo-
graph, “how” questions accrue around the caricature: how did this text 
produce historically located meanings? Possible answers appear swiftly as 
the caricature channels a panoply of racist libels. The cutout refers to nar-
ratives of the “Old South” through its depiction of a black youth outdoors, 
wearing ill-fitting clothes that suggest poverty and parental neglect.3 The 
caricature’s bandaged toe might connect to the racist motif of African 
Americans attacked by animals, particularly alligators.4 One could place 
the image in conversation with films of the 1920s and 1930s, linking the 
rural setting to that of, say, Gone with the Wind (1939) or the action of eat-
ing with that of the African American characters in Our Gang/The Little 
Rascals (1922 – 44), who stereotypically feasted on watermelon. The scrawl 
on the fence, “i l o v e  r a s t u s ” (with each s illiterately reversed), connects 
the figure to the turn-of-the-century Cream of Wheat icon of the same 
name and, in combination with the oversized slice of watermelon, associ-
ates African Americans with consumable commodities. In these readings, 
the caricature embodies a dehumanizing expression of racism or a tool 
by which white Americans could symbolically commodify or otherwise 
control African Americans long after slavery ended.5
The “watermelon” photograph constructs race, however, through 
neither an isolated woman and her “whys” nor an isolated caricature and 
its textual “hows,” but instead through a complex interaction between the 
two figures. The woman entangled herself with the wooden caricature: she 
slipped her thumb in the crevice of its palm, grasped its forearm, pretended 
to consume what it consumed. As she mingled her body with the caricature’s, 
posing so they might together flatten into a photograph, she complicated and 
disturbed the distinction between person and text, “why” and “how.” Of the 
two subjects that posed at the Hotel Exposition in about 1930, only one was 
sentient, but she took her cues from the inanimate caricature. The woman 
arranged her body in response to the caricature’s coordinates; it prompted, 
inspired, and structured her actions. In this dense interaction between thing 
and human, the caricature scripted the woman’s performance.
The term script denotes not a rigid dictation of performed action but, 
rather, a necessary openness to resistance, interpretation, and improvisa-
tion. As photographs in this essay will show, the woman’s pose was not 
unique, but it was not compelled: other people posed with parallel wooden 
cutouts, in roughly the same historical moment, in different ways. When I 
describe elements of material culture as “scripting” human actions, I am 69  Social Text 101  •  Winter 2009
not suggesting that people lack agency. Rather, I am proposing that agency, 
intention, and racial subjectivation co-emerge through everyday physical 
encounters with the material world. I use the term script as a theatrical 
practitioner might: to denote an evocative primary substance from which 
actors, directors, and designers build complex, variable performances that 
occupy real time and space. A play script, whether Hamlet by William 
Shakespeare or Operation Hamlet by Richard Foreman, combines proper-
ties of elasticity and resilience so that the play remains recognizable even 
as it inspires a unique live performance each night.6 That which I call 
a “scriptive thing,” like a play script, broadly structures a performance 
while simultaneously allowing for resistance and unleashing original, live 
variations that may not be individually predictable.
As focus shifts from the caricature or the woman in isolation to the 
movements enacted between them, questions of “why” versus “how” burst 
from their binary configuration into a triangle: psychological questions of 
why a person acts and textual questions of how material culture produces 
meaning give way to questions of how humans perform with racially mean-
ingful, three-dimensional material culture. In the moment captured in the 
“watermelon” photograph, a caricature was insentient but active, while a 
person was agential but reactive. These complexities demand a new ques-
tion: how do people dance with things to construct race?
Scriptive Things
Things, but not objects, script actions. Martin Heidegger and more recent 
scholars of “thing theory” define an object as a chunk of matter that one 
looks through or beyond to understand something human.7 A thing, in 
contrast, asserts itself within a field of matter. For example, when an 
amateur cook uses a knife to chop an onion, the knife might function as 
an object that the amateur barely notices; in this scenario, the knife is 
only a tool used to obtain the chopped onion that the human desires. For 
a trained chef, however, a knife can never be an object: for such a person, 
each edge of a knife glitters individually with potential and stubbornness, 
with past, present, and future motions of slicing and chopping.8 The 
trained chef’s knife is thus a thing with which a chef negotiates, while an 
amateur’s knife is an object to the extent that it is only a means to an end. 
If the amateur’s knife should slip and cut a finger, however, that knife 
suddenly becomes a thing that has leapt up and asserted itself, a thing 
that demands to be reckoned with.9 The difference between objects and 
things, then, is not essential but situational and subjective.
Objects are important insofar as they manifest, respond to, or trans-
mit meaning that originates in humans. A thing demands that people con-
front it on its own terms; thus, a thing forces a person into an awareness 70  Bernstein ∙ Material Culture and the Performance of Race
of the self in material relation to the thing. When a thing makes a human 
body a “thing among things,” it upsets the boundary between person 
and object.10 The thing and person are unmoored from fixed positions 
of difference and twirl in sudden mutual orbit, each subject to the other’s 
gravity. Thus the thing “names less an object than a particular subject-
object relation.”11 The destabilizing interaction between human and thing 
constitutes what Arjun Appadurai called the “social life of things,” or “the 
things-in-motion that illuminate their social context.”12 An object becomes 
a thing when it invites a person to dance.
Things are not alive, but people “behave,” as W. J. T. Mitchell notes, 
“as if works of art had minds of their own, as if images had a power to 
influence human beings, demanding things from us, persuading, seducing, 
and leading us astray.”13 Thing theorists have eloquently explored the ways 
in which this animative power derives from the psychological investments 
of people or from a thing itself. However, things also literally shape human 
behaviors. A chef’s knife, a laptop computer, and a wooden caricature all 
invite — indeed, create occasions for — repetitions of acts, distinctive and 
meaningful motions of eyes, hands, shoulders, hips, feet. These things 
are citational in that they arrange and propel bodies in recognizable ways, 
through paths of evocative movement that have been traveled before. 
Objects become things when they trigger what Joseph Roach calls “kin-
esthetic imagination” as a “faculty of memory” — as when a knife cuts a 
finger and the person to whom that finger is attached (or was attached, in 
the worst case) performs a dance of pain that is stylized through its citation 
of gender, class, age, race, and other categories of analysis.14 Kinesthetic 
memory is a way of “thinking through movements — at once remembered 
and reinvented — the otherwise unthinkable, just as dance is often said to 
be a way of expressing the unspeakable.”15 Stylized bodily performances 
in everyday life are utterances of thoughts that cannot be expressed in 
words. These thoughts are neither conscious nor unconscious, neither 
wholly voluntaristic expressions of intention nor compulsory, mechanical 
movement. Things invite us to dance, and when we sweep them onto the 
dance floor, they appear to become animate. 
At the deepest ontological level, then, performance is what distin-
guishes an object from a thing. In J. L. Austin’s terms, objects are “constat-
ives” in that what is most important lies beyond the material or the utter-
ance (a constative describes something beyond itself: an amateur’s knife 
is a means to a diced onion), whereas things are performatives in that they 
do something: they invite humans to move. Dances with things, too, are 
performative in that they constitute actions: they think, or, more accurately, 
they are the act of thinking. Things script meaningful bodily movements, 
and these citational movements think the otherwise unthinkable.71  Social Text 101  •  Winter 2009
Determined and Implied Scripts
Things script performances in two ways: through orders and blandish-
ments. Orders issue through determined actions that are necessary for 
a thing to function. For example, a novel’s determined actions include 
opening the covers and reading English print from left to right. While it 
is possible to not open a book’s covers and to use a novel as, say, a door-
stop, that use redesignates the novel functionally as something other than 
a novel. To use an English-language, printed book as a book, one must 
open the covers and read words from left to right. These actions are broad 
and necessarily stable across time and geography. 
The force of determined actions becomes clear through a close read-
ing of E. W. Kemble’s 1898 A Coon Alphabet.16 Kemble — a white artist and 
writer who is best known for his advertising logos and for his illustrations 
in the first edition of Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, an 1892 edition of 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and works by Joel Chandler 
Harris and Paul Laurence Dunbar — wrote and illustrated this vicious 
alphabet book in which African American characters are scalded, stung 
by bees, bitten by alligators, pummeled, and battered. In A Coon Alphabet, 
Kemble directs violence particularly at African American characters who 
reach toward social advancement. For example, Kemble opens his book 
with the rhyme, “A is for Amos / what rides an ole mule / so he can be early /   
each monin ter school.”17 The final line of the verse is accompanied by an 
illustration of the mule pitching Amos violently toward a building marked 
“Gramer Schole.” Thus the book ridicules African Americans’ education 
and connects their learning to violence.
This literary-visual content combines crucially with the book’s physi-
cal properties and the sequential actions that those properties script for 
the reader. Kemble formatted his alphabet book as an “alphabet array” or 
“worldly alphabet” — that is, one based on the repetition of the phrase “is 
for,” as in “A is for Apple.”18 During the nineteenth century, this format 
became dominant over other types of alphabet books, such as the “body 
alphabet,” in which contorting human figures represent each letter, or the 
“swallow alphabet,” in which letters eat other letters or are eaten by children 
or animals. By listing objects from apple to zither, or people from archer 
to zany (jester), “alphabet arrays” seem to index the world, rendering it, in 
Patricia Crain’s words, “graspable, and, most strikingly, obtainable.”19 As 
such, the alphabet book “initiates the individual into that world.”20 
Crain uses the terms grasp, obtain, and initiate figuratively, but the   
physical configuration of Kemble’s book literalizes the first two and sheds 
new light on the third. In Kemble’s book, each letter of the alphabet receives 
two pages of illustration. On the first page, the reader encounters the first 
three lines of a rhyme. For example (fig. 2), “D is for Didimus / what blew 72  Bernstein ∙ Material Culture and the Performance of Race
down a gun; / now he and his sister — ”. The incomplete rhyme and inter-
rupted rhythm create a sense of tension and inevitability: the reader seeks 
the satisfaction of the rhyme’s closure. The format of the book instructs the 
reader literally to grasp the page and turn it to obtain the missing portion of 
the rhyme. The next page (fig. 3) completes the rhyme in a way that brings 
violence upon the African American characters — a process repeated with 
differences twenty-four times in Kemble’s book (two letter rhymes end 
without violence against African Americans: one verse ends with an Afri-
can American character punching a fish, and another resolves without any 
violence when a group of three swimmers who thought they were threat-
ened by a whale discover that the hump in the ocean is actually a floating 
watermelon). The reader’s literal grasping-obtaining action doubles with the 
“worldly alphabet” book’s figurative claim to render the world graspable and 
obtainable as knowledge; thus the reader physically causes the characters to 
meet their violent fate, while the format of the “worldly alphabet” configures 
that fate as an objective, phenomenological part of the world, as apparently 
unconstructed and discoverable as an apple. 
Kemble scripted this meaningful action for the reader. He could 
have included each full rhyme in a two-page spread; instead he chose, less 
obviously, to leave every left-side page blank. No evidence suggests that 
Kemble consciously thought about the history of alphabet books or that 
he aimed to inculcate young readers of any race with a psychological urge 
to attack African Americans. Regardless of his conscious or unconscious 
intentions, upon which the archive is silent, Kemble designed the book 
so as to impel the reader’s grasping-obtaining, to conflate that action 
Figure 2. E. W. Kemble, A Coon Alphabet (New York and London: Russell, 1898), n.p. Beinecke Rare 
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with the perpetration of violence against African American characters, 
to substitute satisfaction at a completed rhyme for any other emotion one 
might feel while participating in violence — and to repeat that sequence 
twenty-four times. 
The act of turning the page of Kemble’s alphabet book, which Crain 
might call “initiation” into a world of alphabetically indexed, naturalized 
violence against African Americans, I would describe as “enscription” — that 
is, interpellation through a scriptive thing that combines narrative with ma-
teriality to structure behavior. Scriptive things such as Kemble’s alphabet 
book hail human actors as distinctly as a police officer crying out, “Hey, you 
there!”21 Like the police, scriptive things leap out within a field, address an 
individual, and demand to be reckoned with. The ontological distinction 
between things and objects is that things hail. And they do so persistently, 
constantly, when we are alone and in groups, when we think about them and 
when we do not, when we respond obediently and when we resist, when we 
individually or collectively accept the invitation to dance, refuse it, accept 
but improvise new steps, or renegotiate, deconstruct, or explode roles of 
leader and follower. A hail demands a bodily response: turning to face the 
police or turning the page of the book. By answering a hail, by entering the 
scripted scenario, the individual is interpellated into ideology and thus into 
subjecthood.22 Interpellation occurs not only or even mainly through verbal 
demands followed by bodily actions, as in Althusser’s scenario, but through 
encounters in the material world: dances between people and things.
Kemble’s alphabet book determinatively scripts the reader’s grasping-
obtaining action and, through that ritualistic behavior (repeated twenty-
Figure 3. E. W. Kemble, A Coon Alphabet (New York and London: Russell, 1898), n.p. Beinecke Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University74  Bernstein ∙ Material Culture and the Performance of Race
four times), initiates or interpellates the reader into one specific version 
of the world — one in which violence against African Americans is as 
satisfying, inevitable, and banal as the act of turning a page in a book. 
To resist the script by, say, flipping the pages in reverse or random order 
is to interrupt linear alphabetization itself. Therefore, without executing 
the determined physical action, it is impossible to use Kemble’s alphabet 
book as an alphabet book. 
Things script behavior not only through determined actions that 
are required for function, but also through implied or prompted actions. 
A useful example appears in a black doll owned in the 1850s by Frances 
Eliza Hodgson, a white girl who would grow up to become Frances Hodg-
son Burnett, author of many best-selling children’s books, including The 
Secret Garden and Little Lord Fauntleroy. This girl called her black doll 
“Uncle Tom.” Imagining herself as “the wicked Legree,” she tied the doll 
to a candelabra stand and whipped “Uncle Tom” with “insensate rage.”23 
The child’s actions did not proceed only from a psychological urge; rather, 
her performance of whipping responded to two distinct cultural prompts: 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s narrative and the materiality of the doll itself. 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin provided a preexisting scenario that the child entered 
through play. Her selection of one particular doll to play Uncle Tom was not 
random but was prompted by the doll’s physical properties: its black face, 
its grin (which suggested, Burnett later wrote, that the doll was “enjoying 
the situation” of being “brutally lashed”), and the plaything’s composition 
of gutta-percha, a form of rubber used in dolls specifically to enable them 
to survive physical abuse that would destroy a doll made of porcelain or 
wax.24 No evidence suggests that the doll’s manufacturer intended for a 
girl to name the black doll “Uncle Tom” or to whip it, but the plaything 
did script broadly violent play: black rubber dolls were manufactured, 
as patent applications for such dolls often specified, to withstand rough 
use, and this doll’s smile suggested that violent play was acceptable, even 
enjoyable.25 While the materiality of black ceramic figurines can, as Tavia 
Nyong’o suggests, propose “blackness as a hardened form of subjectivity,”26 
black rubber dolls configure blackness as an elastic form of subjectivity 
that can withstand blows without breaking. This elasticity enables the fun 
of roughhousing with rubber dolls to extend through practices that would 
shatter ceramic figures and thus terminate play. Burnett’s material doll 
converged in its historical context with the plot scenario provided by Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin to prompt, inspire, and structure one child’s performance of 
racial violence, a scene of subjection.27 
A novel is itself a scriptive thing that issues both orders and blandish-
ments. For example, Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, when published in book 
form in English, determines that the reader, regardless of historical context, 
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this determined script and still use the novel as a novel. In Stowe’s historical 
context of mid-nineteenth-century sentimental culture, however, the novel 
also cued or prompted a reader to weep at the death of Little Eva — another 
scene that Frances Hodgson Burnett performed, casting a white doll as 
Eva and herself as “all the weeping slaves at once.”28 
Burnett understood the novel’s prompt to weep at Little Eva’s death 
because she possessed “performance competence,” a parallel to the con-
cept of “literary competence” developed by reader-oriented critic Jonathan 
Culler. Culler argues that literature functions as a system of signs; just as 
comprehension of an individual word depends on competence in a linguistic 
system, comprehension of a single text depends on a minimal understanding 
of literary genre (for example, the competent reader approaches a novel, 
a scholarly monograph, and a dictionary with different expectations).29 
Similarly, the competent performer understands how a book or other thing 
scripts broad behaviors within her or his historical moment — regardless of 
whether or how the performer follows that script. Competence differs from 
literacy in both reading and performance: a reader who possesses literacy 
but not literary competence might read a novel and a scholarly monograph 
and understand each individual sentence while failing to understand the 
conventions and functions of the respective genres. In parallel, a person 
who possesses performance literacy but not performance competence would 
understand that a chair exists, literally, as an object to accommodate sit-
ting, but would not understand that a beanbag chair and a Hepplewhite, 
as things, prompt different styles of sitting and that each of those practices 
of sitting is embedded in a system of culture, a habitus.30 
Unlike an incompetent performer, who cannot decode a thing’s 
invitation to dance, a resistant performer understands and exerts agency 
against the script. Often, however, an action that appears to be transgres-
sive actually follows a script’s range of implications. Oscar Wilde gestured 
toward transgressive scripting when he famously quipped, “One must have 
a heart of stone to read the death of Little Nell without laughing.”31 The 
humor in Wilde’s observation depends partially on the fact that laughter, in 
the nineteenth century or today, is a possible response to sentimentalism. 
To laugh at the death (or life) of Little Nell or Eva is not to exile oneself 
to a lunatic fringe but to indulge in an apparently resistant action that 
the text’s script does permit — or even, covertly, invite (in contradiction, 
certainly, to the novelist’s intention). Indeed, in November 1853, a young 
woman named Else Elisabeth Hysing Koren attended a theatrical pro-
duction of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and observed in her diary that the audience 
“laughed and clapped as loud as they could” at Little Eva’s misfortunes.32 
This moment reveals a range of implied actions Stowe’s novel scripted in 
its historical moment: it prompted actors to dramatize the work and audi-
ences to pay to attend the show. (Koren was clearly familiar with the novel, 76  Bernstein ∙ Material Culture and the Performance of Race
as she listed discrepancies between the book and the play in her journal.) 
Within the theater, some audience members laughed at Little Eva, while 
Koren’s reference to the revelers as “they” suggests that she did not share 
their mirth (her evening was not a washout, however: she noted that the 
scenery was “pretty” and “the theater itself was attractive”).33
The scriptive thing is a heuristic tool for dealing with incomplete 
evidence — and all evidence is incomplete — to make responsible, limited 
inferences about the past.34 A brief tabulation of some performances con-
sidered heretofore suggests the evidentiary gaps that the scriptive thing 
can bridge. In the case of Frances Hodgson Burnett’s performance of 
doll-play, the available evidence includes an adult’s published reportage 
of her long-past thoughts, emotions, and actions; a narrative frame (Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin) that structured the child’s play; Burnett’s description of the 
doll’s appearance and composition; and contextualizing archival evidence 
relating to the manufacture of similar dolls and to other girls’ practices 
with dolls in the 1850s. Burnett’s actual gutta-percha doll, however, is not 
extant. E. W. Kemble’s A Coon Alphabet presents an almost inverse con-
figuration of evidence: in this case, evidence includes the material thing 
of the book; but no written archive, published or unpublished, attests to 
the producers’ or consumers’ intentions. We have contextualizing infor-
mation in the history of alphabet books, but we have no corroborating 
archival evidence — no journal entry, no letter, no photograph or film 
clip, no eyewitness account — to tell us how living children interacted with 
Kemble’s book. These disparities do not necessarily mean, however, that 
we can make more reliable inferences regarding performances involving 
Burnett’s doll than regarding Kemble’s book. To the contrary, we can 
make more reliable inferences about the latter, because it is possible that 
Burnett misremembered, distorted, or flat-out lied in her memoir, but it 
is not possible that no child ever turned the pages of Kemble’s alphabet 
book. By reading things’ scripts within historically located traditions of 
performance, we can make well-supported claims about normative aggre-
gate behavior: in the 1890s, competent performers turned pages of picture 
books; in the 1850s, competent performers cried (and laughed, as Koren 
observed) at the death of Little Eva. And in the 1930s, recreational sites 
such as carnivals and arcades abounded with opportunities for Americans 
to pose for photographs in fantasy sets. We can best understand the steps 
in the “watermelon” photograph’s dance in the context of these other, 
contemporary dances with similar moves.
Parallel Gestures: Arcade and Hotel Exposition
While there is much we do not know about the caricature, we do know 
that at least once, at the Hotel Exposition in New York City’s Grand Cen-77  Social Text 101  •  Winter 2009
tral Palace in approximately 
1930,  one  light-skinned 
woman stood behind it and 
pretended to enter the scene 
and  interact  with  a  figure 
while  posing  for  the  cam-
era. This gesture is a twice-
behaved behavior that reca-
pitulates other occasions in 
which humans interact with 
inanimates for the purpose 
of  snapping  a  photograph: 
wax  museums,  life-sized 
photographic cutout figures 
of celebrities or politicians, 
and, especially in the mid-
twentieth  century,  arcade 
novelties in which people in-
sert their bodies into wooden 
scenes.35 In one such arcade 
scene (fig. 4), a girl enters 
a fantasy of regional Amer-
ica by posing in a covered 
wagon  with  wooden  oxen 
(the canopy over the wagon, too, may be cleverly painted wood). The 
covered wagon is but one of many set pieces in which Americans posed in 
the early- to mid-twentieth century; also common were cutouts of boats, 
airplanes, cars, and trains. 
Many performances in arcade sets provided a safely bounded space 
for play at transgression. “Jails,” for example, were common: dating cou-
ples, families, or groups of friends posed in a wooden cell, often grasping 
the bars and snarling comically at the camera (fig. 5). Also common were 
crudely sexual and comic scenes, as in figure 6, in which a shirtless man 
in an apron scrubs a buxom, apparently nude woman who splays her legs 
open — a scene that combines mild gender transgression (a man in an 
apron) with an equally noncommittal sexual tease (an image of a woman’s 
body simultaneously displayed and hidden, a sexual cartoon that substi-
tutes for and blocks out real flesh).
The “watermelon” caricature appeared in about 1930 at the Hotel 
Exposition, a carnivalesque mélange of a business meeting, a county fair, 
and a consumer orgy. The Hotel Exposition, an annual gathering of busi-
nesspeople involved in the hotel industry, ran every year from 1915 through 
the 1960s and was usually located at New York’s Grand Central Palace, a 
Figure 4. Arcade photograph, mid-twentieth century.  
A girl performs a fantasy of regional America.  
Author’s collection78  Bernstein ∙ Material Culture and the Performance of Race
massive convention hall that 
occupied the city block be-
tween Lexington and Park 
avenues and Forty-sixth and 
Forty-seventh  streets  until 
it was demolished in 1964. 
Although the exposition was 
ostensibly for professionals 
in the hotel trade, it repli-
cated  many  aspects  of  the 
arcades,  boardwalks,  and 
fairs that occasioned posed 
photographs in cutout scen-
ery.  Carnivalesque  amuse-
ments at the Hotel Exposi-
tion  attracted  members  of 
the public, often to the point 
that they outnumbered the 
professionals.  In  Novem-
ber 1929, for example, only 
three weeks after the stock 
market crashed, more than 
100,000  people — most  of 
them members of the public 
rather than hotel industry professionals — attended Hotel Exposition events 
that ranged from formal lectures and “Hotel Accountants’ Day” to cook-
ing competitions, dances, and a “musical extravaganza” titled “A Trip to 
Havana.” The main attraction every year, however, consisted of hundreds 
of booths in which manufacturers and distributors of food, furniture, ap-
pliances, and other items displayed their wares.36 Some of these exhibits 
capitalized upon nostalgia by using county fair motifs, as when the booth 
for Kirsch’s Richmond Inn displayed, in 1924, the “world’s largest ham,” 
a 94-pound slab of pork bequeathed by a 1,064-pound hog owned by E. 
Lee Trinkle, the governor of Virginia.37 Other booths celebrated modern 
technology as they hawked inventions to steam-clean clothes, wash spinach, 
and ventilate buildings.38 
Interactive pleasure suffused the exposition’s paeans to both moder-
nity and nostalgia, urban and rural America. An automatic door, now a 
fixture in every supermarket, debuted at the Hotel Exposition in 1931. This 
“Stanley Magic Door,” which pleasurably “mystified” visitors, performed 
its technological “magic” only in response to a person’s movements.39 Nos-
talgic displays, too, used interaction to attract attention: in a highlight of 
the 1924 exposition, visitors to the third floor of the palace encountered an 
Figure 5. Arcade photograph, inscribed on verso  
“2-1-1970.” Eight people of varied ages pose in a set  
of the “Long Beach Jail.” Author’s collection79  Social Text 101  •  Winter 2009
artificial stream “liberally 
stocked”  with  live  trout. 
For fifty cents, one could 
rent  a  pole,  fish  for  ten 
minutes,  and  take  home 
whatever one caught (“a 
tagging  machine  was  in 
operation, so that the fish 
might be taken anywhere 
without the owner running 
afoul of the New York State 
Game  Commission”).40 
Visitors sampled produce, 
rode electric hobbyhorses, 
played  mechanical  golf 
games, threw suction darts, 
tossed  bottles  into  auto-
matic glass smashers, and 
stuck their fingers into the 
hose of a vacuum cleaner 
to assess its strength.41 By 
1937, visitors had come to 
expect physical interaction 
with the displays, forcing 
exhibitors to post Hands 
Off  signs  to  mark  non-
interactive exhibits, such 
as confectionary sculptures prepared by master chefs.42
In this fairlike atmosphere in which manufacturers enticed consum-
ers and hotel professionals with interactive fun, one woman posed for a 
photograph behind a caricature of an African American youth eating 
watermelon. It is possible that the woman in figure 1 ducked behind a deco-
ration not intended for such use, but the context makes it far more likely 
that this caricature was yet one more interactive display — that it existed, 
like the cutout covered wagon, for the purpose of staging a performance 
to be photographed. Evidence within the photograph itself supports the 
supposition that the caricature sanctioned, and indeed existed to shape, a 
human pose. The lighting is not haphazard but relatively even; it minimizes 
shadows by illuminating from left, right, and above. The caricature stands 
several feet in front of a wall or painted background, which allows space for 
a human body (if the caricature had not been intended for interactive fun, 
the gap between the wood and the wall would have wasted expensive space 
on the floor of the expo). The carefully coiffed woman, with not a hair out 
Figure 6. Arcade photograph, mid-twentieth century.  
A woman and man insert their heads into a risqué scene. 
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of place, looks not like she just climbed over or through a fence that extends 
beyond the frame of the photograph but, rather, like she walked comfort-
ably behind a delimited segment of scenery. Her pose is still, symmetrical, 
with no sense that she is about to bolt if she gets caught where she does 
not belong. The woman’s absence of tension or apprehension manifests 
itself especially clearly in her left hand, which grasps the caricature’s hand 
gently: her pinkie floats as elegantly as that of a duchess holding a teacup. 
The caricature’s scale is distorted, yet it conforms generally to the scale 
of a human body; the thing is neither two feet tall nor twelve. Indeed, the 
limited distortion aligns the caricature with other cutouts, as in figure 6, 
where the aproned man’s elongated legs are out of scale to both the human 
poser and the woman in the bath. The “watermelon” woman’s mischievous 
smile suggests transgression — an intimation, perhaps, that she ignored a 
Hands Off sign and inserted her body where it was not permitted. However, 
many cutouts built mischief into their scenes, as in “jails” or the risqué 
“bathing” image. The sense of naughtiness in the jail, bath, or watermelon 
photographs derives from the outlaw, sexual, or racial content of the sce-
narios, not the act of stepping into the scene. 
Even when an image does not determine a gender-transgressive 
performance (as the “bath” cutout does in its aproned man), it can still 
Figure 7. Arcade photograph, 
mid-twentieth century. A man 
and woman insert their heads 
above a cutout scene. The 
man poses as a primitivized, 
muscular man in an animal 
skin, while the woman poses 
as a bathing-suit-clad, curvy 
woman (a likely reference 
to Tarzan and Jane, or to 
“strong man” vaudeville 
acts). The scene includes 
depictions of what may be 
footlights, implying that the 
two characters are performing 
on stage. The primitivized 
man holds a chain but does 
not appear to be shackled. 
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imply one. Take, for example, a cutout scene of Tarzan and Jane. A dat-
ing couple, strolling on a boardwalk, pauses to have a snapshot taken: a 
man inserts his head in the hole above Tarzan’s muscle-bound body, and 
a woman substitutes her face for that of the scantily clad Jane (fig. 7). A 
second couple encounters the same scene and conceives an apparently 
creative transgression: she floats her head above the ape-man’s body, and 
he, grinning for the camera, plays Jane (fig. 8). In this example, the gender-
normative and gender-transgressive performances are both scripted by the 
thing (much as weeping and laughing are both scripted by Little Nell’s or 
Eva’s death). An appeal of the Tarzan/Jane cutout is that its constraints 
allow for a temporary, Bakhtinian inversion that reinforces rather than 
undermines existing configurations of power.43
What is most striking about the Tarzan/Jane cutout is not only that it 
prompts a heterosexual couple to perform both “proper” and “improper” 
gender, but that it “projects” (to use Elaine Scarry’s word) a heterosexual 
couple — as does the “bath” cutout.44 Philip Fisher echoes Scarry in his 
assertion that “most things imply the human by existing like jigsaw pieces 
whose outer surfaces have meaning only when it is seen that they are 
designed to snap into position against the body”45 — an image literalized in 
wooden cutouts that provide negative space for and thus arrange the human 
body. While a jigsaw puzzle calls for positive and negative curves to snap 
together, a wooden cutout calls for humans to shape themselves — either 
their heads, as in the “bathing” image, or their full bodies, as in the covered 
Figure 8. Arcade photograph, mid-twentieth century. A woman and man play at gender 
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wagon and jail sets — into the absent pieces. The Tarzan/Jane cutout “pro-
jects” or “implies” heterosexuality by inviting a woman to configure herself 
as the positive to fill the void above one figure and a man to do the same 
with the other — and which person performs which role depends on whether 
the couple follows the “proper” or “improper” script. Put differently, the 
human body functions as what Fisher calls a “latent presence” in things 
such as a spoon, which “is, at one end, a negative of the hand, designed to 
fit in the space left within a fist,” while “the other end of the spoon is the 
positive of the mouth.”46 Certainly, two men or two women, or a woman 
and a man who are not a couple, could pose in the Tarzan/Jane cutout, 
just as the positive end of a spoon could (and not infrequently does) enter 
a jar rather than a mouth. Nevertheless, the concavity of a flatware spoon 
is designed in relation to the curve and size of a mouth, not a jar, and the 
Tarzan/Jane cutout exaggerates polarized, sexualized gender (Tarzan with 
bulging muscles, Jane with tiny waist and oversized breasts) in relation to 
the normalized gender polarity of a heterosexual couple. While the Tarzan/ 
Jane cutout could physically accommodate the pose of a same-gender pair, 
it actively invites — scripts — the performance of a mixed-gender couple in 
either the gender-normative or gender-transgressive configuration. Thus 
the Tarzan/Jane cutout “projects” or “implies” a heterosexual couple, 
which in turn functions as a “latent presence” in the thing.
The “watermelon” cutout, like arcade sets of covered wagons or 
jails,  provided  space 
for  a  face  and  body; 
and as much as a spoon 
addresses a mouth and 
the Tarzan/Jane cutout 
projects a mixed-gen-
der  pair,  the  “water-
melon” cutout invited 
a white person to enter 
its scene in New York 
City’s  Grand  Cen-
tral Palace circa 1930. 
Many  arcade  photo-
graphs invited posers to 
mingle with black cari-
catures, as is the case in 
figure 9, in which two 
light-skinned children 
enter a giganticized box 
of Fairbanks Gold Dust 
Washing Powder.47 The 
Figure 9. Arcade photograph, inscribed on verso “2/6/63.” Two 
light-skinned children insert their faces above the bodies of the 
Gold Dust Twins logo on a giganticized box of Fairbank’s Gold 
Dust Washing Powder. Author’s collection83  Social Text 101  •  Winter 2009
icon of Gold Dust soap — the wooden bodies against which the children 
pose their faces (with differing levels of logistical success) — was the Gold 
Dust Twins, a grotesque and immensely popular caricature of African 
American children. The designer of the Gold Dust Twins was none other 
than E. W. Kemble, author and illustrator of A Coon Alphabet. The water-
melon caricature and the Gold Dust cutout, as much as A Coon Alphabet, 
hailed their users and interpellated them, through scripted actions of pos-
ing, into a subjecthood that was specifically raced white. As difficult as it 
is to imagine an African American who lived in a time of Jim Crow laws 
deriving pleasure from these things, it is even more difficult to imagine 
the makers of the Gold Dust and “watermelon” cutouts intending African 
Americans or other people of color to pose within the respective scenes. 
The Gold Dust and “watermelon” cutouts projected white users much as 
the Tarzan/Jane cutout projected a cross-gender couple.
The watermelon or Gold Dust cutouts and the Tarzan/Jane cutout 
ultimately framed not just human faces but identities: whiteness and het-
erosexuality, respectively. Interpellation, in Althusser’s classic scenario, 
begins with a kind of framing: the police officer calls out, “Hey, you there!” 
and  the  individual  implicates — frames — herself  by  turning  around. 
The scriptive thing hails a person by inviting her to dance. The person 
ritualistically engages the matter, and in that process, subjectivation —   
how one comes to “matter” — occurs. Interpellation occurs not only 
through performative utterances but also through thing-based enscrip-
tion into identifiable, historicized traditions of performance from both the 
stage and everyday life. 
The “watermelon” photograph invited a nonblack person to dance a 
dance of racial impersonation that Eric Lott famously called white people’s 
“love and theft” of blackness.48 Love and theft is inscribed in the carica-
ture: the literal declaration of love scrawled on the fence post contrasts 
with the past physical violence marked by the young man’s bandaged 
toe. The light-skinned woman performed love, or at least tenderness, in 
her gently curved left hand, even as she bared her teeth to thieve a bite of 
watermelon. By temporarily entering the scene and performing blackness, 
and by simultaneously stepping into a performance tradition of love and 
theft, this actor asserted not blackness but whiteness — a fraught endeavor 
for a woman whose name, according to the caption on the back of the 
photograph, was Helen Hernandez. 
Helen Hernandez’s Performance of Race
How might we understand Helen Hernandez’s racial identity, and how 
does that understanding prompt a reevaluation of her dance with a cari-
catured thing? When Hernandez posed at the Hotel Exposition in about 84  Bernstein ∙ Material Culture and the Performance of Race
1930, she did so in the midst of a series of dizzying revisions in the 
racial designation of people who might now call themselves Latina/o or   
Hispanic — revisions that made the 1920s, in the words of historian Mae 
M. Ngai, “an extraordinary time when immigration policy realigned and 
hardened racial categories in the law.”49 For people of Spanish and Latin 
American descent, this hardening dynamic crystallized around the ques-
tions of who was and was not white, and who could or could not immi-
grate to the United States. Three touchstones reveal the process by which 
some people — including, perhaps, Helen Hernandez — became legally 
fixed, in this moment, as white, while managing the cultural contestability 
of that whiteness. These touchstones were the Immigration Act of 1924, 
the 1930 census, and the 1940 census.
The 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act set a quota system by 
which immigration from any European nation was limited to 2 percent 
of the number of people from that country living in the United States at 
the time of the 1890 census; it also prohibited all immigration from Asia. 
North, Central, and South American countries, however, were exempt 
from national quotas. As Ngai notes, Mexicans, unlike people from Asian 
countries, were “not excluded from immigration on grounds of racial 
ineligibility because, for the purposes of naturalization, and therefore for 
immigration, the law deemed Mexicans to be white” (as Mexicans and 
Mexican Americans had been counted in the 1920 census).50 
The 1930 census radically revised this designation by inventing a new 
racial category: “Mexican.” The year Helen Hernandez may have attended 
the Hotel Exposition, 1930, was the only year in which the U.S. census 
designated “Mexican” as a race; thus, for the first time, the federal govern-
ment formally identified a Latin American group as nonwhite.51 Census 
workers were instructed to visually identify “all persons born in Mexico, 
or having parents born in Mexico, who were not definitely white, Negro, 
Indian, Chinese or Japanese” and to designate such people as “Mexicans,” 
to be counted as nonwhites. The 1930 census also produced a table titled 
“Estimated Number of Mexicans Included in the White Population in 
1920” — a tally, according to sociologist Clara E. Rodríguez, of people 
imagined to have been “miscounted” as white in the 1920 census.52 Thus, 
in 1920, the U.S. census registered Mexicans who were not of African, 
Native American, or Asian descent as white; in 1930, however, the census 
reversed itself, counted such individuals as members of the “Mexican” 
race, and took pains to “correct” the previous censuses’ categorization of 
such people as white.
The 1940 census reversed the racial designation yet again, recat-
egorizing Mexicans and Mexican Americans as white, as the 1920 census 
and the 1924 Immigration Act had done. Census takers in 1940 received 
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nitely Indian or of other nonwhite race [should be described and counted] 
as white.” Thus “within a decade,” Rodríguez notes, “Mexicans were 
shifted from their own ‘Mexican’ category to being included in the ‘white’ 
category — unless they appeared to census interviewers to be ‘definitely 
Indian or of other Nonwhite races.’”53 The 1940 designation of Mexicans 
as white unless identified otherwise applied to other groups that migrated 
in larger numbers after World War II: “Puerto Ricans in the late 1940s 
and 1950s, Cubans during the 1960s, and Dominicans and Central and 
South Americans in the late 1960s and 1970s.”54
When Helen Hernandez posed with a wooden caricature in New York 
City sometime around 1930, then, she was most likely designated racially 
“Mexican” if she or her parents had been born in Mexico, or “white” if 
she was of any other Latin American or Spanish descent — and either 
categorization would have been in transition and culturally contested but 
also in the process of stabilizing through law. The identity of the Helen 
Hernandez who posed for the photograph is unknowable: the 1930 census 
counted forty-four Americans named Helen Hernandez, and because the 
Hotel Expo attracted visitors from across the nation and around the world, 
there is no way to prove which Helen Hernandez grins from behind the 
wooden cutout. 
Among the forty-four Helen Hernandezes that the 1930 census regis-
tered, three were New Yorkers, and these individuals deserve special atten-
tion for the ways in which they mark a range of complications within the 
legal category of whiteness. The youngest of these Helen Hernandezes —   
clearly not the one photographed at the Hotel Expo — was six years old in 
1930. She was born in Manhattan to Gebano and Esperanza Hernandez, 
both Spanish speakers from Puerto Rico, and the 1930 census listed all 
members of the family as white.55 Either of the other two New Yorkers 
named Helen Hernandez could have been the one who posed at the Hotel 
Exposition. The younger of these, who lived in the Bronx, was born in New 
York City in about 1906 to parents from Cuba; she lived with her Spanish-
speaking mother, Amelia Hernandez, and worked as a stenographer. The 
census counted both women as white.56 The older Helen Hernandez, a 
public school teacher born in 1899, lived in Queens with her daughter Car-
men; her husband, Lewis Hernandez, a Spanish-speaking immigrant from 
Venezuela; and her mother, Melanie Levy. The census listed all members 
of that household, as well, as white.57
New York’s three Helen Hernandezes and their families emblematize 
the range of people who were in the process of being legally stabilized as 
white in 1930: Spanish-speaking immigrants from Venezuela, Puerto 
Rico, and Cuba; their American-born, English-speaking children; and, 
in the case of Melanie Levy and Helen Levy Hernandez, perhaps, Jews 
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ity). Had one of these Helen Hernandezes been Mexican or Mexican 
American, the 1930 census would have designated her as nonwhite (as it 
did, for example, Helen Hernandez of Fresno, California, who was born 
in Mexico in 1901).58 This emerging legal fixity coexisted, however, with 
an underlying, ongoing cultural instability.59
In the moment imprinted on photographic film, Helen Hernandez, 
whose race — white, “Mexican,” or something else entirely — was in the 
process of being legally and culturally codified as well as contested, fol-
lowed the script embedded in a thing that projected a white user. She stood 
precisely where the thing invited her to stand, and she mugged exactly as 
the thing prompted her to mug. In so doing, she and the thing danced a 
dance of white racial identity — a racination that originated, coalesced, and 
was contained in neither human flesh nor wooden caricature alone, but in 
the processual interaction between them. At the same moment that immi-
gration policy and the census “realigned and hardened racial categories in 
the law,”60 Helen Hernandez aligned herself bodily with a black caricature 
and thus categorized herself as white, and she hardened that categorization 
through the obdurate shine of the photograph’s surface. 
Hernandez’s racial impersonation balanced claims of likeness and 
distance: even as she entered the scene and ate along with the caricature, 
she raised her pinky delicately and looked directly at the camera, thus 
acknowledging her audience and alienating herself from her performance. 
She danced with the caricature, physically embraced it, while figuratively 
winking at the audience to say, “I’m not this.”
“Why” and “How” Revisited
Helen Hernandez playfully embraced and distanced herself from black-
ness and thus ratified the project of racial stabilization that was already 
under way through law. The rich “how” of this performance makes 
repressed questions of “why” resurface — unanswerable but tantalizing 
questions about conscious identity and psychological motivation. Was she 
Helen Levy Hernandez, and was she Jewish? As she danced her dance 
of racial impersonation in about 1930, did she think of her coreligionist 
Al Jolson, whose blackface performance in the 1927 film The Jazz Singer 
worked to assimilate Jews into whiteness?61 Did she hope, consciously 
or unconsciously, to subsume her ethnic and religious difference to the 
whiteness constructed through temporary blackness? Or was she Helen 
Hernandez, stenographer and daughter of Cuban immigrants? If the year 
was 1929 rather than the curator’s estimated 1930, this Cuban American 
Helen Hernandez could have posed after attending the Hotel Exposition’s 
musical extravaganza, “A Trip to Havana.” The script to that perfor-
mance is not extant, so we cannot know whether the show’s representation 87  Social Text 101  •  Winter 2009
of this Helen Hernandez’s parents’ country was exoticizing, derisive, cel-
ebratory, or some combination thereof, or some other tone entirely. And 
we cannot know whether “A Trip to Havana” might have filled this Helen 
Hernandez with delight, longing, or shame; with an impulse to contrast 
her Cuban heritage favorably against blackness, or to mask her racial 
complexities beneath the whitening effects of corkless blackface. And we 
also can never know whether this Helen Hernandez, a stenographer who 
earned her living by receiving the swift flow of speech, arresting it in 
shorthand, and then translating that cipher into typewriting, might have 
thought, as she danced with the caricature, about speed and fixity, about 
code and legibility, about a skilled body that can transform that which 
seems fleeting into that which may endure. We can never know what she 
thought about the act of freezing a moment in a photograph.
That flash-freeze constitutes the defining gesture in this perfor-
mance. Helen Hernandez’s direct gaze into the camera’s lens indicates 
that she consciously knew her photograph was being taken and that she 
built and oriented her performance around that knowledge. The material 
photograph is, then, both a “how” and a “why” of Helen Hernandez’s 
performance: the “watermelon” cutout arranged and stylized a human 
body — that is, prompted the “how” — for the purpose — the “why” — of 
taking a photograph. Helen Hernandez danced with three material things: 
the cutout caricature, the camera, and the photograph-to-be. Hernandez 
followed the choreography that the three things scripted not only in that 
she stood where the cutout told her to stand and “invented” the ostensibly 
transgressive joke that it told her to invent, but also in that she oriented 
herself to a camera and stilled herself for the snapping of the photograph 
for which the caricature created the occasion. The cutout was indeed like 
a “jigsaw piece whose outer surfaces have meaning only when it is seen 
that they are designed to snap into position against the body”62 — two 
bodies, those of Helen Hernandez and the anonymous photographer. 
The cutout provided a negative space for the photographer to stand in 
as effectively as it provided the negative space where Hernandez inserted 
her body. Three things and two humans danced this dance. One of those 
scriptive things — the photograph — did not yet exist, but it was perhaps 
the most important element, because its production provided the “why” 
for the event.
Of the stylized movements that this all-important, not-yet-existent 
photograph scripted, perhaps the most crucial one was stillness, because 
Hernandez’s stillness conflated person and thing both at the moment of 
the pose and then, later, within the photograph. Hernandez playfully 
entered a scene and likened herself to the unmoving caricature (even as 
she distinguished herself from it) by imitating not only its chomp from 
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ness resulted in a photograph that is free of blurs — a photograph in which 
human and caricature appear equally flat and sharp. In this equalizing, the 
photograph confuses person and thing: a swift glance at the photograph 
might fool the eye into momentarily perceiving two wooden figures or two 
masked and costumed humans. Ironically, the sharpness of the photograph 
blurs person and thing: had Helen Hernandez flinched at the snap of the 
camera’s shutter, the resultant blur would have differentiated her from 
the wood, much as one child’s ill fit with the Gold Dust cutout interrupts 
any potential illusionism in figure 9. But Helen Hernandez’s photograph 
stages no such disruptions.
The distinction and transitivity between person and thing has encap-
sulated deep anxieties about race ever since slavery legally defined some 
black bodies as property and all black bodies as inherently ownable. Har-
riet Beecher Stowe named this anxiety when she originally, scathingly, 
subtitled Uncle Tom’s Cabin “The Man That Was a Thing.”63 Stowe’s 
novel, as Philip Fisher has shown, performed the cultural work of the 
“redesign of the boundary” between person and thing: that is, Stowe 
enacted culturally a distinction between African American people and 
things that Emancipation later ratified juridically.64 Recently, Bill Brown 
argued that this historical ontology “congealed” within black collectibles 
such as mammy cookie jars, and that narratives of such objects coming to 
life and wreaking havoc “recollect . . . the ontological scandal perpetrated 
by slavery” and the “re-enactment of the breakdown of the person/thing 
binary” embedded in both slavery and Emancipation.65 
In the “watermelon” photograph, however, a thing does not come 
alive; rather, a living woman becomes a thing. When Helen Hernandez 
stilled herself in a pose for the purpose of taking a photograph, she knew 
that she was coproducing, with the camera and the photographer, a material 
artifact that would imagistically collapse her and the caricature into one 
seamless whole, one thing. By coproducing this photograph, Helen Hernan-
dez literally objectified herself — or, more accurately, bethinged herself.
The borders of thing/person, black/white — so volatile and dangerous 
for African Americans, so provocative to Stowe — became, in Helen Her-
nandez’s performance, a controlled space for delimited play, just one more 
aspect of the Expo’s interactive, consumer-based fun, no more threatening 
than posing in a “jail” or walking through a Stanley Magic Door. Calm 
steadiness registers in the balance among the four extremes of Hernandez’s 
body: her right hand caresses the caricature, while her left hand grabs it 
aggressively, and a mischievous smile dominates her face. But these three 
bodily poles, respectively manifesting love, theft, and play, root through the 
fourth pole of her body: her feet, which are planted firmly on the ground 
and thus cause a sense of control and willingness to pervade and define 
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blackness and thus constructed whiteness, and who played at being a thing, 
a potential possession, and thus affirmed that she was not one. 
Archiving the Repertoire
As W. B. Worthen has recently pointed out, a powerful current within 
performance studies contrasts “archival” memory — written and material 
text that can be housed in an archive — with the “repertoire” — embodied   
memory of traditions of performance, including “gestures, orality, move-
ment, dance, singing — in short, all those acts usually thought of as ephem-
eral.”66 Diana Taylor and others call for “shifting the focus from written 
to embodied culture, from the discursive to the performative,” because 
the archive “sustains power,” while the repertoire often enacts social 
agency and resistance, especially of oppressed peoples in the Americas.67 
Taylor describes the “relationship between the archive and the reper-
toire” as “not by definition antagonistic or oppositional”; the two forms of 
knowledge “usually work in tandem” (as in the wedding ceremony, which 
requires “both the performative utterance of ‘I do’ and the signed mar-
riage license”).68 However, a model of interaction, or even of harmonious 
cooperation, reifies a polarity between the two forms of knowledge.
The scriptivity in the “watermelon” photograph calls into question 
the very model of archive and repertoire as distinct-but-interactive. The 
word script captures the moment when dramatic narrative and move-
ment through space are in the act of becoming each other.69 Accordingly, 
archive and repertoire are one in the materiality of the photograph, which 
both records one woman’s past performance and serves as a proleptic 
prop in that performance (that is, the future production of the photo-
graph functioned as a key purpose of the performance; thus, the not-yet-
existent photograph scripted Helen Hernandez’s actions). The caricature, 
camera, and photograph are all both artifacts of and scriptive props in a   
performance — that is, simultaneously archive and repertoire, with neither 
form of knowledge preexisting the other.70 
When a thing scripts actions, it manifests the repertoire of its histori-
cal moment. An alphabet book prompts the sequential turning of pages 
in coordination with parallel practices with other alphabet books; Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin cues actions of weeping and laughing, playing and whipping, 
for audiences with performance competence in sentimental culture; a not-
yet-existent photograph operates with a camera and a caricature to script 
a pose that produces racial subjectivation. Scriptive things are simultane-
ously archive and repertoire; therefore, when things enter a repository such 
as the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, the repertoire arrives 
with them. Scriptive things archive the repertoire — partially and richly, 
with a sense of openness and flux.90  Bernstein ∙ Material Culture and the Performance of Race
To glimpse past repertoires through the archive requires a revision 
of what qualifies as “reading” material evidence. A scholar understands a 
thing’s script both by locating the gestures it cites in its historical location 
and by physically interacting with the evidence in the present moment. 
One gains performance competence not only by accruing contextualizing 
knowledge but also, crucially, by holding a thing, manipulating it, shak-
ing it to see what meaningful gestures tumble forth. Ultimately, historians 
must place our living bodies in the stream of performance tradition. The 
archive then becomes a ghostly discotheque where things of the past leap 
up to ask scholars to dance; and we listen, accept the invitation, and, hearts 
pounding, step onto the floor.
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